



Developing and implementing security for soft targets and urban crowded places

by Paul van Soomerep (ansoomeren@DSPgroep.eu)

Protection of Public Spaces

“Identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating the risks of terrorist threats on Public Spaces:

Cooperation between all

stakeholders”

stakeholders”

Brasov July #72019



Designing Out Crime Association (edoca): www.E-DOCA.eu

International CPTED Association (ica): www.cpted.net

Cutting Crime Impact: www.cuttingcrimeimpact.eu


DSP: www.DSPgroep.eu



Scope: Risks of Terrorist Threats on Public Spaces



Focus on:






Focus now is mainly on terrorist and before + during



Focus on:





Timeline and Focus: combined in one matrix

Timeline →	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Focus ↓				
Terrorist/ offender				
Victim (direct on the spot)				
Victims (general; society & community)				
Situation				




Terrorist threats

- First suicide attack in Russia 1881 (killing Tsar Alexander)
- Since then 13500 suicide attacks
- Top 5 countries suicide attacks: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria
- Jihad and left/ right extremism (Oklahoma City/ McVeigh, Norway/ Breivik and Christchurch)
- Recent attacks: mainly Middle East, NOT in Europe
- Europe is a low risk continent!
- European attacks mainly Russia
- Western Europe (EU) is a very-low-low risk region

Source: The Price of the Paradise by Iain Overton, 2019



Number of suicide attacks worldwide by year




Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism; CPOST



Most problems NOT in the West!

European numbers and numbers by country (1982-2015)






Hence... relax,
we're at low terrorism risk in Western Europe!





Compare this: 25.000 people killed each year in traffic


Road traffic victims in the European Union, 1996-2016





On the other hand... relax? Remember we are in Romania

Traffic fatalities per million inhabitants by country in 2018



<https://www.statista.com/statistics/323869/international-and-uk-road-deaths/>



So what might be the biggest risk of terrorism threats?
Not the death toll, but probably spreading ... fear!





Spreading fear/ feelings of insecurity

- Objective(crime/terrorism) +subjective(feelings)
- But: "*If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences*"
- Fear and insecurity can poison a community
- People stay at home, no social interaction, deserted streets (= crime generator)

So what about security then?



Do you feel secure in this house?

DSP



Or in this one?

DSP



I prefer this house!

DSP





Fear & Feelings of insecurity: a new issue, but it's here to stay (so we better learn to deal with it)

Too much police and too much force may harm feelings of security (sometimes)





Toomuch security and fortess
mentality harm feelings of security.
Fearwill be the result





These measures make one thing clear :
authorities are in **PANIC!**





Fake security fueling feelings of insecurity



Zaltbommel, 2017



Dokkum, Santa claus 2017



SSA: Stupid Security Approach



Amsterdam Rembrandtplein, December 2017 (left) and (right) January 2018 (well designed SSA)




Christian Schneider evaluation Berlin Breitscheidplatz terrorist attack (2016):

“Improvisierte Barrieren nutzen nur den Tätern”
(improvized concrete blocks only facilitate terrorists)

Concrete block Scenario Berlin

- Scania truck R450, 40 ton, 65 km/h
- Energy 6.500Kj
- Concreteblock 160x120x80 = 3.6 ton
- Dispersion of concrete 194 meter!!!

Feeling insecure might be very RATIONAL!







The focus now: on 'terrorist' and 'before/during'



Focus on:



Traditional criminology :
focus also mainly on offender/terrorist





Proposal: lets try to follow a rational risk approach


- At least standardise the terminology
- We might also standardise the process: risk assessment first (risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation)

You better think
(think)....

Think before we act




Worldwide Risk management standard: ISO 31000:2009





ISO 31000



Risk management: the process

- Context

Risk assessment:

- Risk identification
- Risk analysis
- Risk evaluation

Risk treatment

The risk management process should be an integral part of management and decision-making and integrated into the structure, operations and processes of the organization. It can be applied at strategic, operational, programme or project levels.

But note:
a risk may be before,
during, after and
afterwards!



A more rational risk oriented approach: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)

- An approach to prevent crimes (including terrorism), anti-social behaviour and feelings of insecurity (fear of crime)

through

- a multi disciplinary, multi-agency or partnership process:

by

- planning, design and management
- a particular physical and social environment (city, town, neighbourhood, community or a specific place)



The essence: changing social *and* physical environment

CPTED is about the question
how to prevent crime
and feelings of insecurity,
by changing the social and physical
environment using design, planning,
management and engineering.





Social + Physical/technical. Example of the gun- man

- A gun does not kill people on its own
- A man without a gun is not able to shoot someone
- The combination of gun + man results in a new entity: the gun-man
- The gunman is dangerous!
- A dangerous socio-technical combination




Lesson learned:

Physical/technical versus Social? Forget this dilemma! It does not exist!

Let's facet:

“We are sociotechnical animals,
and each human interaction is
sociotechnical.”

(Bruno Latour, 1994/64)






CPTED = timeplace specific approach


The CPTED approach is always timeplace specific.
The neighbourhood level – as a geographical
social-physical entity – can be a pillar structuring the approach.

CPTED might also be an example for a new
approach in other fields like **Health Promotion**,
smart clean and healthy cities and **..PRoTECT**




CPTED:
there are more options
to tackle crime/ terrorism
& fear of crime

CPTED:
It takes 3 to Tango:
offender, situation, victim



situation



offender

victim





Terminology (rather a mess)

CPTED pronounce: Sep-Ted (America's, Asia/Pacific, Africa)

➔ Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CPUDP/CPUDP&M (Europe)

➔ Crime Prevention through Urban Design, Planning and Management


Also 'crime proofing' (mainly products), Designing Out Crime, Design Against Crime, security by design,






International CPTED Association (ICA)


www.cpted.net



CPTED associations and chapters worldwide



Source: Adapted from Moffat (1983, p 23)
CPTED model





Rules of thumb for CPTED/CRUDP

VACA:

- **Visibility:** clarity and visibility, sightlines, lighting, surveillance/ surveillability
- **Accessibility:** accessibility or, on the contrary, inaccessibility (access control)
- **Clarity:** a clear zoning of territories, territoriality
- **Attractiveness:** an attractive environment



Learn from new approaches to tackle crime and feelings of insecurity together!

DSP


Police



Social/community
worker



Urban planner/
designer/manager





And please do not forget the residents (the ultimate end user)

DSP



Hence: Multi agency approach/partnership

- Not only law enforcement (justice/police)
- Also other participants: residents, business, local authorities, education, urban planning/design/management, social institutions, etc.





Working together in partnership is difficult

- Different organisations = different languages and cultures
- Different approaches (hard/soft, quick/slow, preventive/reactive)
- Different management styles
- Different planning systems and different financial options
- Privacy issues




What we thus need is standards for the
partnership -process and standards on
terminology/definitions



What we need is standardized and scientific Planning and Design followed by good Management/Maintenance

- Standardisation: one set of concepts, same terminology/ definitions, same process/approach based on voluntary consensus (not obligatory)
- Scientific Evidence based working: what works? Difficult in Europe because of low number of terrorist attacks
- Learning cycle (plado-check-act) quality management





Standards on crime prevention by urban planning and building design

DSP



European Committee for Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation
Europäisches Komitee für Normung

Nederlandse voornorm

NVN-ENV 14383-2 (en)

Criminaliteitspreventie - Stedenbouwkundig en
bouwkundig ontwerp - Deel 2: Stedenbouwkundig
ontwerp

ISO/TC 292/WG 6 ISO22341:




International
Organization for
Standardization

Prevention of crime - Urban planning and design - Part 2:
Urban planning


ISO 15196:2000
2000



A concrete CPTED approach: 3 decisions to make



1. **Where?**
Location, boundaries, postal codes
Define the area/neighbourhood/place



2. **What?**
What is the crime problem? What is the risk?



3. **Who?**
Stakeholders. Who is involved?



A valuable Standard + Manual on Safe and Secure Cities!
CEN/EU are working on update (Czech standardization
UNMZ)

DSP






Example of integrated approach: UKSecuredby Design & Manchester CIS

DSP



(Slides Andrew Wootton, Salford University)



- Introduced in Manchester in 2006
- Obligatory for every new building and new development
- Initially only for major residential developments
- Includes:

PART A: Crime Impact Assessment

- *12-month crime pattern analysis of 1km area around development site*
- *General risk assessment relating to type of building and its use(s)*
- *Site visit and site-specific risk assessment*

PART B: Crime Prevention Recommendations

- *ALO comments and assessment of plans/drawings (layout and spatial relationships)*
- *Secured by Design (e.g. target hardening)*
- *Conclusions*



service | re-design

DSP

- Developers commission and pay for CIS production
 - *Developers pay for timely and professional advice service*
 - *Developers benefit from fewer “**last-minute surprises**” and planning delays*
 - *Once requirement to consider crime and security is understood, architects tend to rise to the challenge*
- Architectural Liaison Service rebranded as **Design for Security** consultancy
 - *Tailoring the service to reflect the needs of architects, designers & developers*
- Also includes terrorism attacks (long IRA experience in the UK)





Lessons learned from CPTED approaches (worldwide)

- **Prevention – and CPTED works**
- CPTED aims at **time/terrorism + fear/feelings** of insecurity
- The theoretical **roots** of the concept CPTED are **very diverse**
- Measures are a **mix of social and technical-physical measures** (building & living)
- The CPTED approach is always **time-place specific**. The neighbourhood level – as a geographical social-physical entity – can be a pillar structuring the approach
- **Very different groups of stakeholders have to be included** in the process to make the process work in a specific national and local environmental context.

Lessons learnedII

- It's an organic approach adapting to local situations and participating stakeholders .
- A multi-disciplinary process with diversity in participating partners and partnerships
- Even such an 'all join in approach' can be very much instrumentalized by **schemes and standards** but these have to be **process oriented**
- For CPTED approaches **structural evaluation** aiming at learning what works, what doesn't and what is promising for successful prevention as well as successful implementation **is a challenge**. Evidence based working 2.0 exists for CPTED but needs further exploration. Still difficult for terrorism because the number of cases in Europe is so limited



Just a few examples following the CPTED approach

Timeline —————→ Focus —————↓	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Terrorist/offender				
Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">• On the spot• In general (society)				
Situation				



Before & situation: CPTED and Community Policing

CPTED approaches are perfect but also community policing (give and take info to/from local communities)

Take FEAR into account.
Too visible and disassuring measures don't help. Disguise or delete them.

Disguise: concrete block = bench, flower pot, waste truck/fire engine, or food truck

Timeline →	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Focus ↓				
Terrorist/offender				
Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">On the spotIn general (society)				
Situation				





Terrorist/offender & 'before' (+ partly during)

Intelligence: catch them if you can

Timeline →	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Focus ↓				
Terrorist/offender				
Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">• On the spot• In general (society)				
Situation				





During & victim + situation

Think beforehand about evacuation spots. Are they really safe and good? (Manchester 1996 IRA evacuation place: Victoria Station)

How do you evacuate an area (Manchester 75,000–80,000 people shopping and working in the vicinity of the blast)?

Timeline →	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Focus ↓				
Terrorist/offender				
Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">On the spotIn general (society)				
Situation				





After & victims + situation



Idea to find rescue: Bezalel's
(Jerusalem) Hope Spot
(DesurbsProject, 2014):

HopeSpot's objective is to
provide an efficient, cost
effective, accessible and
portable product to ease
communication challenges
with crowds

Timeline —————>	Before	During	After	Afterwards
Focus ————v				
Terrorist/offender				
Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">• On the spot• In general (society)				
Situation				



Immaterial:

- | Timeline  | Before | During | After | Afterwards |
|---|--------|--------|-------|------------|
| Focus  | | | | |
| Terrorist/offender | | | | |
| Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On the spot In general (society) | | | | |
| Situation | | | | |









- And the costs. Include insurers (nationally)?
- Cost of Manchester blast 1996: £ 800.000.000,-





Final check:

Is your current Counter Terrorism (CT) approach OK?

- Is it following a rational **risk management approach** (complying to ISO 31000:2018)? 
- Hence is the general approach **proportionate** but also: is each specific approach (e.g. in location) **proportionate**? 
- Are you following the **VACAR** rules in all CT approaches?
 - **V:** How **visible** are the measures and should they be that visible? 
 - **A:** Is the city still **accessible** for all (including handicapped). Are the measures taken effective to stop terrorists? 
 - **C:** Clarity? Is there **clear zoning** of territories? 
 - **A:** Are the measures taken perceived **acceptable** and do they reassure or **disassure**? Think: fear! 
- Is the general approach and are the specific measures **effective** (remember the 'concrete block solutions' of the Stupid Security Approach) 



Paul van Soomeren, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

DSPgroep: www.dspgroep.eu

European Designing Out Crime Association www.edoca.eu

International CPTED Association www.cpted.net

EUCOST action TU 1203 <http://costtu1203.eu>

EUH2020 Cutting Crime Impact (CCI) www.CuttingCrimeImpact.eu



Thank
you!

