

**EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist – Practical Use** 

**DG HOME Unit D2** 

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### Where Can I Use the EU VAC tool


















### Analysis of the detected vulnerabilities
















EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist for Public and Security Authorities

This document is EU Classified when forms are answered and completed.




- VAC is an element of the Risk Assessment Process
- Individual tool for aid in assessment of different soft targets by operators
- Not an APP! Yet....

EU Aide Memoire

- Graphical illustrations and ideas how to identify and measure vulnerabilities
- Full range of different threats and mitigation measures
- Concepts of the checklist were tested during NATO Security Summit and other Public Events 2017, 2018 and 2019. Distributed in April 2019.









Excel Format - Paper and Laptop version not most practical

Tablet excel version more useful

EU Training on use of checklist is required





### **EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist Support**

- Las Vegas Village AMBULANCE WITH SUSPECT
- Existing national pre-assessment activities (conducted prior to event as part of National standards)
- National threat assessment review
- Approach to venue
- Entry areas
- Within the arena
- Exit areas
- Authorized Vehicles staging areas
- Transportation connection points

Process Support




### **EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist – Content**



Question

Number	Pre-Assessment Questions	Detail if available
1	have there been any activities recorded/or reported by either the venue operator or other parties (tenants or users or general public) which appeared suspicious by nature and which have been reported either internally or to public authorities? Have any public authorities investigations been carried out in respect of such reports?	
2	have there been any activities near any/or connected to any areas which are being subject of the the assessment (any areas such as approach, arrival at venue, venue itself)? Can you identify more critical hot zones that are of concern?	-
3	Have there been any attempts or activities to test the security measures, either accidental or appeared made on purpose ?	
4	Have there been any threats made against any of the operator or the parts/areas (ex. public garage used by the shopping mall or metro)?	
5	Have there been any attempts to survail any of the activities of the target venue that could be survailed by UAV or other types of physical or electronic survailance?	
6	Have there been any labour associated actions that may cause the target venue be subject of a hostile action (change of security companies or maintenance or other labour disputes)?	
7	Are there any procedures that would allow detection of hostile survailance at the target venue or areas outside which may be proned to a possible attack?	
8	Have there been reports of hoax events that may have prompted deployment of crisis responce or security measures?	
9	Are there any known points near the critical person movement areas where know terrorist operatives or radicalised individuals are present?	
10	Are you aware if the venue operator includes presence of individuals or entities representing a higher risk and which for that reason may be targeted (ex. shops associated with US or other high(er) risk countries?	
11	Are there any areas which may be more exposed due to organised crime?	
12	What type of electronic survailance and alert mechanism exist to monitor the hot zones? Are these tools effective enough to allow for live identification of potential threats or post incident investigations?	
13	What types of temporary electronic (ex. UAV survailance ) or physical survailance could be effective (ex. human posting etc?)	
14 15	What types of awereness and alert mechanism exist that could identify potential threat (ex. human reporting, electronic apps, alarm mechanisms ?)	








### **EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist Support- Threat Cases**









#### **UAV Risk Assessment Matrix - TRANSPORT**




This UAV assessment matrix has been developed by European Commission (DG HOME) as part of 2017 EU Action Plan to Enhance Protection of Public Spaces which includes emerging threats such as UAV. This document contains information aimed to build awareness of UAV capabilities and under no circumstances can information or instructions in this document be considered to replace Member States National authority national security measures dealing with UAV threats. This information is a part of the EU Vulnerability Assessment

Check List on protection of public spaces





Ult capacity: Explosive/pyrotechnic charge Ult capacity: max 1700 kg (max 1000 gr), chemical substances (max 1000 Range/endurance: approx. 1000 km/24 hours





charge (max 20 kg), chemical substant (max 20 I), etc.

UAV type and specifications


Type: MICRO quadcooter unmodified (below 300 gr) Lift capacity: N/A (except UAV itself)
Range/endurance: 00-500 meter/10-20 min

Type: XX-COPTER unmodified substances (max 4000 gr/4 I), etc.

Threats/attack scenarios **Considerations** Illustration of target Assessing the probability, risk to the target, and consequences Could such areas be targetable by the UAV are there any air obstacle (ex. trees. Could a UAV be easily identifiable against the skyline, or is the architecture of the transport infrustructure buildings (rail station, buss station, maritime passenge erminal) and the fences of such type (ex. nearby forest) that would make identyfing an approaching or operating UAV challang specific UAV restriction in the area where the event activity takes place ? Is this estriction applicable to all classes of UAV or Risk to target: ex. and enforcment tools that exist to monitor such no-fly restrictions? Have the authorities established a process authorities established system for detectio and tracking of UAV identified as posing a threat to the event or public areas ? How well and rapid is the responce mechanism lesponse and capacity. Does the authority(s)

Home Affairs









'We're watching you' ISIS
tells Brit jihadis to use
Google Earth to plot deadly
attacks
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#### Hostile Surveilance Review

Number

3

10

#### **Pre-Assessment Questions**



Hostile survailance can take many forms and means and can threat not only the event but also the critical phases linked with the event (tranport of persons to venue), therefore hoostile survilance should be investigated in any area associated with the event or site (ex. parking garage, transportation points, entry and exit points to the venue, event venue itself, vendors and suppliers operating in the venue etc) Detecting any efforts to carry out hostile survailance may be much more difficult in view of the available information on the social media and interent. Use of UAV can aid to reconfirm certain physical data which could be obtained from the internet site like "street view" and others sites

Can you (if not already in place) establish a hostile survailance awareness and reporting programme with the entities along the route or in the main event area to aid the authorities in mapping potential hostile

Have you verified which data concerning your facility (target) is available in the mainstream internet sources and if the media is current and up to date (it shows generally what is the present layout or conditions)

survailance attempts.

Have there been any attempts to survail any of the activities of the target venue that could be survailed by UAV or other types of physical or electronic survailance?

Can you sweep the area for any webcams that may be present in the area using foot patrols or UAV monitoring?

Are there any CCTV systems that can be hacked and become available to the perpertrator

Hostile survailance can be performed by other individuals than the perpertrator, have there been cases that the individuals have conducted themselves in a suspicious manner?

9 Can you establish before the event a hotline for reporting of suspicious survailance?

What types of awereness and alert mechanism exist that could identify potential threat (ex. human reporting, electronic apps, alarm mechanisms?)



### EU Aide Memoire - EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist - Hostile Svlce




Some Webcams offer more than 2 year history review! What vulnerability does this create?



### Internal and External Quality Control - Red teams Operations



- Self-assessments <u>rarely</u> provide the necessary insight into how well security measures are implemented inside the stadium.
- Every operator should establish own quality control programme which should objectively monitor implementation of the established operator security programme.
- Therefore, before and during a special event, quality control measures are being monitored according to a defined process and scope.




- Special quality control teams (red-teams) should be established consisting of law enforcement and operator security staff tasked with verification of the security measures in an unbiased manner.
- Operations should be randomly deployed and measure compliance with procedures before, during and after the event is concluded(during patrons leaving the event)
- The testing of the security measures should be carried out according to agreed principles, be objective and proportional. Any quality control measures must be carried out by experienced and properly trained staff on carrying out such quality control activities.
- Quality control manual procedures should ensure that retrieval of all quality control items used must be ensured. All quality control activities should assure recording of the quality control process.






### EU VAC Resource – How to Use it ??















Home Affairs



# Actual Exercise Simulation Aid Memoire - EU Vulnerability Assessment






# Actual Exercise Simulation Aid Memoire - EU Vulnerability Assessment



Home Affairs









### Joint Vulnerability Assessment of the Sonae Sierra Shopping Mall, Lisbon PT 13-15 November 2019



- To prepare for Christmas 2019 activities Mega Shopping Mall in Lisbon was subject to joint vulnerability assessment
- "EU vulnerability assessment checklist" (EUVAC)
  was used by the Security Management of Sonae
  Sierra, Securitas together with GNR
  Gandermerie and HOME to test how the private
  and public operators can perform the
  assessments.
- 3. Risk Assessment Process was carried out and different threats were identified.
- 4. The field use of the EU checklist was used successfully and the users found exercise a valuable lessons before conducting future assessments. The use of the checklist allowed the Sonae security management to pinpoint several vulnerabilities which were corrected





EU Vulnerability Assessment "Untold" Musical Event (RQ)

#### **EU** visit and Counter Terrorism support covered theoretical and practical elements.

- 1. EU presentations on use the "EU vulnerability assessment checklist" (EUVAC) were presented to all the authorities involved in the planning of the event
- 2. Evaluation and use of the EUVAC took place of the SRI and HOME
- 3. SRI and DG HOME designed a fictitious Assault Plan and tested the planned security measures
- 4. Field visits were carried out during the planning of the security measures and were verified during the field implementation.
- 5. Following the field visit by SRI and HOME and the use of the EU checklist, rectification suggestions were identified to amend and introduced additional security measures and provided to the other security services and planners
- 6. 100% of the EU (HOME) recommendations were implemented.





### Users – Lessons Learned - Challenges

- 1. EUVAC caters to most situations and event types. It highlights the different risk and situations that could impact on security
- 2. It is a living document subject to continues amendments
- 3. The "EU vulnerability assessment checklist" has been used in different events ranging from EU Political Summits, Cultural and sport events, critical infrastructures and other targets.
- 4. Interpretation of the threats and impacts on events or targets is not always interpreted the same by all parties
- 5. The tool needs training on its use
- 6. The tool has some limitation due to the amount of information stored most practical in tablet application format
- 7. Local authorities and actors are crucial end-user of such products





